Sri Lanka will not need an 18th IMF programme - Here is why

Sri Lanka will not need an 18th IMF programme - Here is why

By Dr. Kenneth De Zilwa - Global Business Cycle Economist

Sri Lanka's economic policy over the past decade has been dominated by the need to restore public finances viz a viz a higher tax to GDP ratio, the narrative was to manage government debt and rebuild foreign-exchange reserves. This is misplaced as our issue has always been a fragile external sector, and the lack of strengthening and creating long-term stability. The rupee revenues, were necessary priorities, particularly following the economic crisis of 2022, as the narrative spun was that tax cuts were the cause of the crisis. However, as the country moves into the next phase of recovery, an equally important question deserves attention: are we building the productive capacity required to sustain economic stability over the long term?

The distinction is important. A government can improve its fiscal position through higher taxation, expenditure restraint and local debt restructuring. Whilst it can only rebuild reserves through trade surpluses, remittances, tourism receipts and external financing. Therefore lasting external balance sheet economic strength requires something more: an economy with a competitive business model, expanding productive assets, technological capabilities and the ability to earn foreign exchange through widening its export products and services. This is where Budget 2027 should be assessed.
 

What should Budget 2027 achieve?

The main Budget projects revenue and grants of Rs.6,180 billion and expenditure of Rs.7,673 billion. Capital expenditure allocated is Rs.1,750 billion, rising to Rs.2,000 billion when the additional reconstruction provision is included. Debt servicing accounts for 80% of revenue and is projected at Rs.4,850 billion, comprising Rs.2,643 billion as interest and Rs.2,207 billion in principal repayments. Analyzing this more closely reveals that of the total debt of Rs 32 trillion, 60% is domestic and 40% foreign. These figures demonstrate the constraints and the need for local rupee cost reduction measures given that 60% of debt is Rupee debt. Such, cost reduction measures are directly a result of dynamically managing external shocks viz a viz the external balance sheet transmission mechanism, namely, the exchange rate to domestic consumer inputs and cost of production. 
It is within these parameters which the Government must operate and shift its focus to strengthening the external balance sheet. Rupee fiscal discipline alone cannot remain the sole focus, particularly given the country's external debt burden and limited access to external liquidity. Therefore, the direction of public expenditure deserves new thinking and important attention.

A modern approach to public finance is paramount for the national balance sheet growth journey. In this context we need to view public investment as a catalyst for private-sector competitiveness rather than a drain on the treasury. Every rupee of public capital investment should lower the cost of doing business, raise economy-wide productivity, and create productive assets that power future external revenue growth. Equally, education and workforce training must be directly linked to the needs of emerging industries. By combining growth-supportive taxation, reliable infrastructure, and industry-aligned skills with targeted R & D and global partnerships, the state can strengthen corporate balance sheets and help viable local firms compete internationally. Similarly public finance needs to re-orient towards the SME sector as it accounts for 52% of the real economy, 45% of employment and 20% of exports and should be encouraged to capture regional markets. In doing so it’s imperative for SME to have access to low-cost finance, subsidized inputs and technology. Therefore, a national Industrial policy which includes MSMEs should be carved out encouraging industrial innovation, product development and international competitiveness. Most importantly, these measures should be connected through a coherent national strategy rather than implemented as isolated annual budgetary programs.

 

The Government's rupee balance sheet and the national external balance sheet

Since 2015, Sri Lanka has undertaken two major IMF-supported programs: the Extended Fund Facility of 2016–2019 and the current program initiated in 2023. Both programs placed considerable emphasis on rupee fiscal consolidation, rupee revenue mobilization, exchange-rate flexibility, cost pass through, reserve accumulation and structural reforms. Many of these policies were advocated by the IMF during each of the 17 programs. Following the 2022 crisis, these measures became particularly important as the program was institutionalized based on the main talking point of loss of revenue due to tax cuts, not external cash flow. It was believed that in restoring rupee confidence and addressing the country's immediate financing difficulties Sri Lanka would not necessarily require an 18th IMF program. In this regard there has been measurable progress in the rupee revenue collections and administration. The point here is, the narrative was that tax cuts were the causeof the default! Therefore, the focus centered on balance sheet contraction policies, targeting rupee revenues that needed saving and not USD i.e. external balance sheet. However, it was the reverse of this that was the truth!

As of now Government rupee revenue has improved to Rs 4.7 trillion (Jan-Sep 2026, Ministry of Finance Fiscal Review Report), debt restructuring has advanced and gross foreign-exchange reserves have reached USD 7.0 billion. The composition of the USD 7.0 billion is important as it comprises of swaps amounting to USD 3.5 billion and borrowings of USD 2.2 billion.

Therefore, the Government's Rupee fiscal position is only one part of the national financial statement picture. Foreign exchange generative assets is different. It must be earned, attracted or borrowed. Consequently, the national external balance sheet deserves the same attention as the Government's domestic-currency balance sheet. This includes managing the country's external assets, liabilities, reserve position and, most importantly, its capacity to generate future foreign exchange earnings. Sri Lanka's Net International Investment Position stood at USD 43 billion in 2015 to USD 51 billion in June 2026. That is not encouraging progress. Roughly 82% of Sri Lanka's gross external liabilities (which stood at 61.5% of GDP at end-2025) consist of debt obligations-such as bonds, loans, and currency deposits, rather than Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) equity, while the Central Government's share has risen to approximately 56.6% of total external liabilities. The challenge, therefore, is no longer simply to restore rupee stability. It is to reduce the structural vulnerability associated with growing external dependency caused by continued current account deficits (caused by rapidly growing trade deficits) percolating into external borrowings viz a viz the external balance sheet. This can be only achieved by strengthening the economy's industrial capacity in order to generate foreign exchange.

What does the trade and investment picture tell us?

Sri Lanka's merchandise trade performance illustrates the challenge. In 2026, exports i.e. trade, amounted to approximately USD10.7 billion, while imports reached USD 18.6 billion. The resulting the cumulative trade deficit widened to USD 7.9 billion during January–September 2026, compared to USD 5.2 billion in the corresponding period of 2025. More revealing is the composition of total consumer goods imports, as it reached approximately USD 4.0 billion during the first eight months of 2026, up from USD 3.3 billion in the same period in 2025. Over the full nine-month period through September, cumulative consumer import expenditure grew 17.5%. Whilst personal vehicle imports alone reached approximately USD 3.0 billion (2025 -2026), compared with just USD 221 million in 2024. These figures need to be interpreted carefully. Consumer imports and intermediary imports are not necessarily economically undesirable, as they are essential inputs for domestic production. Similarly, not every import automatically creates productive capacity. Nevertheless, the composition raises a legitimate policy question: is Sri Lanka allocating sufficient resources towards expanding the productive assets and industrial capabilities that will generate future foreign-exchange earnings?

It is also important not to assume that particular foreign loans granted for welfare i.e. Asvesuma amounting to USD 800 million would not end up as consumer imports. Foreign exchange is fungible, and such a direct welfare or budgetary support relationship cannot be assumed to be beneficial. The broader concern is whether the country's external liabilities are supported by assets sufficient to increase production capacity and future foreign-exchange income. A sustainable external balance sheet position requires more than managing rupee revenue and imports. It requires expanding the country's ability to earn foreign currency and create a strong local industrial base. One that not only internalizes savings but also competes for global market share.

Two IMF programs and the next stage of reform is coming in the 18th program

The President has already mentioned that a committee is examining the IMF re-entry. As the 17th IMF program ends in March 2027. The experience of the two IMF programs should be assessed in perspective and with caution as we move towards external revenue growth. The first program, implemented between 2016 and 2019, sought to address fiscal and external imbalances. However, it did not prevent the subsequent deterioration in external conditions or the external cashflow crisis of 2021/2022. The current program has contributed to improvement in key macroeconomic ratios with a significant amount of sacrifice made by both the corporate sector and individuals. In fact, the IMF’s October 2026 assessment recognizes the progress made in fiscal consolidation, reserve accumulation and debt restructuring, but warned that the external balance sheet is at high risk. It would therefore be unfair to dismiss the adjustment undertaken or to suggest that nothing has improved in the rupee balance sheet. However, the question now is whether the next phase of policy shift will go beyond mere rupee stabilization, and focus on industrial sustainability and growth of external revenue generative assets.

The IMF itself continues to emphasize the importance of export competitiveness, while World Bank too has admitted in its March 2026 report that state led industrialization should be actively pursued. For decades, mainstream orthodox economics viewed industrial policy as risky government interference that led to corruption and inefficiency. A narrative Sri Lanka has fallen prey to over the past 20 years. The World Bank 2026 report officially reverses that view, concluding that markets alone often fail to solve complex coordination problems-such as building supply chains, training specialized workers, or adopting green technology. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka is trapped with the de-industrialization mindset and limited fiscal policy space to achieve this objective.

IMF’s March 2026 report also identifies the high proportion of debt instruments in external liabilities as a continuing vulnerability. The lesson is that fiscal adjustment, while necessary, cannot by itself transform the productive structure of an economy. Sri Lanka must ensure that the resources released through fiscal stabilization are now accompanied by policies that encourage industrial capacity, productive investment, and strengthen domestic companies enabling them to expand new consumer high end value products and in turn sufficient export volumes at competitive prices.

How other countries use public finances

History shows that industrial powerhouses treat deficits as capital investments: China has run general government deficits averaging over 5% of GDP for a decade (hitting 8.0% in 2026) to dominate green tech and manufacturing, Japan ran multi-decade deficits that pushed public debt to ~200% of GDP while funding R&D and advanced technology, and Germany relied on heavy deficit spending during both its 1990s reunification (peaking at 9.4% of GDP) and its current trillion-dollar infrastructure push. In fact, countries such as China, Germany and Japan provide useful examples of how governments balance sheets can take a longer-term view of public finances and put the national balance sheet to work for the private sector. Their approaches differ, but they share an important principle: budgets and public financial institutions are used not only to manage current expenditure, but also to develop future industrial capabilities. Through infrastructure investment, development finance, research and development, technology programs and support for strategic industries, these countries have sought to help domestic companies develop products and capabilities for international markets. The objective is not simply to preserve existing industries. It is to enable companies to move into higher-value activities, improve productivity and gain market share in emerging industries.

While Sri Lanka cannot simply copy the large deficit spending of China, Germany, or Japan because those economies borrowed in their own currencies while running massive export surpluses, it can adopt their core strategic discipline and focus on the new balance sheet economic model: shifting public resources from consumption to productive export capacity. Following the World Bank’s 2026 industrial framework, Sri Lanka can apply this model within its fiscal limits by phasing out blanket tax holidays in favor of targeted new industrial investments in energy, port, new production technology, logistics, workforce skills, and high-value agro-industrialization, using catalytic public capital and multilateral partnerships to crowd in private local investment as well as attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Thereby sustaining gross fixed capital formation to approximately 38% to 40% of GDP annually over a 10 year period.

A national budget should ask not only what the Government can afford to spend this year, but also what industries, technologies and capabilities the country needs to develop over the next 10 to 15 years.

Strengthening domestic production/ industrial base, MSMEs must become a central priority

This brings us to the role of the Government and corporate sector balance sheet synchronization, namely, long term vs short term. Businesses are the principal shorter term vehicles through which productive assets are created. Technology is adopted, employment is generated and exports are developed. The government can play the long term creator of industrial capacity, reducing the state burden for welfare. Therefore profitability of companies plays a pivotal role in national savings, as strong balance sheets are needed to undertake these activities. When operating costs are high (fuel, electricity cost passed on) financing is expensive and cash flows are weak it limits the availability of resources and capacity to invest. Without sustainable profits, they cannot build strong balance sheets i.e. accumulate retained earnings to finance expansion, research, technology and product development is not an option its mandatory.

This is why public policy must prioritize strengthening corporate balance sheets, the true foundation for capturing global market share, rather than shielding inefficient firms behind permanent protectionism. The government should empower viable domestic companies/industries to compete internationally. It can do this by extending its own (government) balance sheet by delivering reliable infrastructure, predictable regulation, growth-supportive taxation, and access to low-cost finance, while investing in R&D, skills development, and targeted industrial policy. By helping local businesses identify emerging product markets and forging partnerships across universities, research institutions, and global firms, the state can build internationally competitive enterprises. The Government's role should therefore be to create the necessary investible legislation conditions in which businesses can generate profits, retain earnings and reinvest in productive capacity.

From stabilization to productive transformation

Sri Lanka has made considerable progress in restoring rupee balance sheet stability as revenues have now reached 16.5 % of GDP. More than IMF target of 14.2%. These numbers are on par or above the Asia-Pacific peers. But the next phase of economic policy must focus on building the productive foundations of long-term growth. The relationship between public finances and national development needs to be understood more broadly. Government policy and investment should improve business cash flows. Stronger cash flows should support sustainable corporate profits. Retained earnings should finance productive assets, technology, research and product innovation. These capabilities should enable companies to develop new markets, increase production and compete internationally.

Higher production and exports will generate foreign exchange earnings, strengthen the national external balance sheet and reduce dependence on external borrowing. This is the connection between the Government's balance sheet, corporate balance sheets and the country's external balance sheet. Budget 2027 should therefore be judged not only by its revenue targets, fiscal deficit or primary surplus, but also by whether it advances this productive transformation. Sri Lanka has made important progress in its economy. The next challenge is to build an economy capable of sustaining that stability through stronger domestic companies, greater productivity and a more competitive export sector. That is how fiscal consolidation can become the foundation for lasting economic development, reducing external balance sheet dependencies reversing the negative net worth of USD 52 billon rather than moving to the 18th IMF program which is not an end in itself.